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Does Collective Responsibility for Performance
Alter Party Strategies? Policy-Seeking Parties
in Proportional Systems
JAMES ADAMS, LAWRENCE EZROW, SAMUEL MERRILL III AND
ZEYNEP SOMER-TOPCU*
Abstract
Adams and Merrill have developed a model of policy-seeking parties in a parliamentary democracy
competing in a PR electoral system, in which party elites are uncertain about voters’ evaluations of the
parties’ valence attributes such as competence, integrity and charisma. This article extends that model
to situations where voters hold coalitions of parties collectively responsible for their valence-related
performances, such as how voters evaluate governing parties’ competence in handling issues like the
economy, crime and foreign policy crises. It may also be relevant to voters’ evaluations of proto-
coalitions of opposition parties. Computations suggest the central substantive conclusions reported in
Adams and Merrill extend to this generalized model, and that collective responsibility enhances
coalition members’ incentives to converge to similar policy positions but depresses their prospects of
achieving their policy objectives.
In the past decade scholars who analyse politicians’ policy strategies have emphasized the
strategic importance of valence dimensions of voters’ evaluations of political parties and
candidates. Valence dimensions, a term ﬁrst coined by Stokes,1 refer to dimensions ‘on
which parties or leaders are differentiated not by what they advocate, but by the degree to
which they are linked in the public’s mind with conditions, goals, or symbols of which
almost everyone approves or disapproves’.2 Valence dimensions include such factors as
parties’ and party leaders’ images with respect to honesty, competence, charisma, and
unity. These dimensions contrast with position dimensions such as tax policy, foreign
policy and debates over immigration controls and abortion policy, on which ‘parties or
leaders are differentiated by their advocacy of alternative positions’.3 Many recent studies
explore how the introduction of valence dimensions affects the positional strategies of
ofﬁce-seeking or policy-seeking politicians.4
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1 See Donald Stokes, ‘Spatial Models of Party Competition’, American Political Science Review, 57
(1963), 368–77; and Donald Stokes, ‘Valence Politics’, in Dennis Kavanaugh, ed., Electoral Politics
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp.142–66.
2 Stokes, ‘Valence Politics’, p. 143.
3 Stokes, ‘Valence Politics’, p. 143.
4 See for instance James Adams, ‘Policy Divergence in Multicandidate Probabilistic Spatial Voting’,
Public Choice, 99 (1999), 259–74; Timothy Groseclose, ‘A Model of Candidate Location when One
In a recent article in this Journal, Adams and Merrill develop a spatial model of
multiparty elections in parliamentary democracies with proportional representation (PR), in
which voters are motivated by both valence and positional issues, and where parties vary
their policy promises in pursuit of policy objectives.5 Three central conclusions emerge from
the Adams–Merrill paper: ﬁrst, that a Nash equilibrium conﬁguration of parties’ positional
strategies exists, given quite general assumptions about parties and voters; secondly, that for
most realistic scenarios the parties can be expected to coalesce into rival blocs, with one bloc
of parties presenting similar sets of leftist policies, and the other bloc presenting similar sets
of right-wing positions; thirdly, that parties will moderate their policies when their valence
images deteriorate (and will shift to more radical policies when these images improve), an
effect the authors label the centripetal valence effects result.
In this article we generalize the Adams–Merrill model to elections where voters hold two or
more parties collectively responsible for behavior or outcomes that reﬂect on these parties’
valence images. An obvious example of collective responsibility involves a coalition of
governing parties, whose valence-related images may jointly depend on voters’ judgements
about how skilfully the government is handling public concerns relating to the economy,
crime, and foreign and domestic policy crises, as well as governing elites’ reputations for
honesty and unity. And, in certain situations, voters may even assign collective responsibility
to a set of opposition parties, particularly when these parties are widely viewed as a ‘proto-
coalition’, i.e. a likely government at some future time. Of course, voters’ tendencies to assign
collective responsibility for valence-related performance, as opposed to singling out individual
coalition members for special credit or blame, surely vary with the political context.
We extend the Adams–Merrill model to consider how collective responsibility affects
parties’ policy-seeking strategies, when they compete in a PR election in a parliamentary
democracy. Speciﬁcally, we develop a collective responsibility model that allows us to vary
the degree of collective responsibility that voters assign to coalitions of parties, so that we
can analyse situations where voters assign nearly equal credit or blame for valence-related
events to all coalition members, as well as situations where collective responsibility is
attenuated. Our model can also accommodate elections that feature two or more
coalitions of parties. We report Monte Carlo simulations and theoretical results based on
our collective responsibility model, and we compare our results to those we obtain for the
‘basic’ Adams–Merrill model, that does not incorporate collective responsibility. Our
study produces ﬁve central ﬁndings.
First, we ﬁnd that a unique Nash equilibrium in parties’ policy-seeking strategies
almost invariably exists under the collective responsibility model, just as it does for the
Adams–Merrill basic model that does not incorporate collective responsibility.
(F’note continued)
Candidate Has a Valence Advantage’, American Journal of Political Science, 45 (2001), 862–86; James
Adams, Samuel Merrill III and Bernard Grofman, A Uniﬁed Theory of Party Competition: A Cross-
National Analysis Integrating Spatial and Behavioral Factors (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2005); Norman Schoﬁeld and Itai Sened, Multiparty Democracy: Elections and Legislative Politics
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Gilles Serra, ‘Polarization of What? A Model of
Elections with Endogenous Valence’, Journal of Politics, 72 (2010), 426–37; Michael Bruter, Robert
Erikson and Aaron Strauss, ‘Uncertain Candidates, Voters with Valence, and the Dynamics of Candidate
Position-Taking’, Public Choice, 44 (2010), 153–68.
5 James Adams and Samuel Merrill III, ‘Policy-Seeking Parties in a Parliamentary Democracy with
Proportional Representation: A Valence-Uncertainty Model’, British Journal of Political Science, 39
(2009), 539–58.
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Secondly, we ﬁnd that the Adams–Merrill centripetal valence effects result, that parties
moderate (radicalize) their policies when their valence images deteriorate (improve), also
extends to the collective responsibility model.
Thirdly, our computations suggest that the greater the degree of collective responsibility
that voters assign to a coalition of parties, the stronger these parties’ incentives to
converge towards similar sets of policy positions – i.e. the more voters assign joint credit/
blame to coalitions of parties for events that reﬂect on these parties’ honesty and
competence, the greater these parties’ policy-seeking incentives to converge towards
similar sets of policies. This result, which we label the coalition convergence effect, is
relevant to remarkable research by Fortunato and Stevenson, who report empirical
ﬁndings that voters perceive that the policy positions of the governing parties in coalition
governments converge signiﬁcantly over time.6 Our coalition convergence result suggests
that voters’ perceptions of policy convergence between coalition partners may enhance
these governing parties’ abilities to achieve their policy objectives.7 Our coalition
convergence result also implies that in situations where the party system in a PR-based
parliamentary democracy is divided into two rival coalitions (as is arguably the case
in Germany, Norway and Denmark), collective responsibility motivates parties to
coalesce into two spatial ‘clusters’, with modest policy differentiation between the parties
in each cluster.
Fourthly, and relatedly, we present theoretical and computational results that the coalition
convergence effect is driven primarily by the strategic imperative for small, peripheral
members of coalitions – such as the German Greens and the French Communists – to
moderate their positions and thereby converge towards the positions of their more centrist,
mainstream, coalition partners (such as the German Social Democrats and the French
Socialists) – a dynamic we label the peripheral governing party moderation result.
Fifthly, we ﬁnd that when voters ascribe collective responsibility to a coalition of
parties, this depresses the likelihood that the coalition’s members will realize their policy
objectives – a ﬁnding we label the coalition penalty effect.8 This coalition penalty result
plausibly illuminates an empirical puzzle that has sparked widespread scholarly interest:
namely, why parliamentary democracies at times feature minority governments that
receive consistent parliamentary support from parties that choose to remain outside the
governing coalition.9 Our results suggest that parties’ decisions to forgo formally joining
governments whose policies they support may be due to these parties’ desire to avoid
sharing collective responsibility, which can hinder their policy objectives.
6 David Fortunato and Randy Stevenson, ‘Perceptions of Partisan Ideologies: The Effect of Coalition
Participation’, American Journal of Political Science (forthcoming).
7 Although, as we discuss immediately below, voters’ perceptions of collective responsibility hamper
governing parties’ policy-seeking objectives in other ways.
8 We note that the coalition convergence and the coalition penalty effects are reconciled as follows.
Our theoretical results imply that parties that share collective responsibility face diminished prospects of
achieving their policy objectives (the coalition penalty effect). Our results also imply that parties’ best
response to the strategic disadvantages associated with collective responsibility is to converge towards
each other in the policy space (the coalition convergence effect). However, the computational results we
report below suggest that while policy convergence between coalition partners partially mitigates the
strategic disadvantages caused by collective responsibility, nevertheless in equilibrium these coalition
partners’ expected policy outcomes are diminished, compared to what they would be if they did not share
collective responsibility.
9 See, e.g., Kaare Strøm, Minority Government and Majority Rule (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1990).
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POLICY-SEEKING PARTIES IN MULTI-PARTY ELECTIONS UNDER PROPORTIONAL
REPRESENTATION: A VALENCE-UNCERTAINTY MODEL WITH COLLECTIVE
RESPONSIBILITY
Our model, which is a direct extension of the one developed in Adams and Merrill,
employs the assumptions set out in the following three sub-sections.10
Assumptions on Seat Allocations and Policy Outputs
We specify a model in which parties and voters locate along a one-dimensional positional
continuum – which we label the Left–Right policy continuum – and each voter supports the
party that she prefers based upon her evaluations of the parties’ policy proximities and their
valence attributes, using a decision rule that we specify below. We assume that parties’
parliamentary seat shares are exactly proportional to vote shares, i.e. that the voting system
is perfectly proportional. We also assume that policy outputs are determined entirely by the
parliament, an assumption that is best approximated in parliamentary democracies with
unicameral legislatures.11 Finally, we specify that the number of seats in the parliament is
odd, so that there exists a single location for the median legislator.
Following Adams and Merrill, we assume that there are K policy-seeking parties with
preferred positions R1,y,RK and policy positions (strategies) s1,y,sK.
12 We deﬁne the
median parliamentary party (MPP) as the party that, together with all the parties with
policy positions to its left, can form a majority and that can also form a majority if,
alternatively, it were combined with all the parties with policy positions to its right.13 We
further assume that the parties project that following the election the MPP dominates the
policy-making process and that it is constrained to implement its pre-election policy
position. Thus, a party k’s utility Uk for an election outcome is equivalent to its utility for
the policy position of the MPP. Deﬁning f (sj, Rk) as party k’s utility for party j’s policy
position sj, where f (sj, Rk) is assumed to be concave and to peak at Rk,
14 it follows that k’s
utility for an election outcome is:
Party k0s utility¼ f ðsj ; RkÞ if party j is the MPP:
We note that our assumption that the MPP controls policy outputs contrasts with
alternative models of policy making in parliaments – both theoretical and empirical – which
emphasize the policy primacy of the parties in the governing coalition;15 the central
10 Adams and Merrill, ‘Policy-Seeking Parties in a Parliamentary Democracy’.
11 The alternative to a parliamentary democracy is a presidential democracy, in which a president with
signiﬁcant constitutional powers exercises substantial inﬂuence on government policy outputs. Prominent
examples of presidential democracies include the United States and many Latin American countries. By
contrast, every West European country except France is best classiﬁed as a parliamentary democracy.
12 Adams and Merrill, ‘Policy-Seeking Parties in a Parliamentary Democracy’.
13 Thus, if the sk’s are ordered so that s1r s2ryr sK, then the MPP is that party kM such that
parties 1,y,kM and parties kM, kM1 1,yK each include a majority of the seats in parliament.
14 We say that a function U is concave and peaks at x0 if it is continuous, and if for all x in the domain
of U for which x 6¼ x0, @2U@x2 ðxÞ  0 and U(x0).U(x). Note that if U is concave and peaks at x0, then U is
strictly increasing on the left of x0 and strictly decreasing on the right, i.e. if x1,x2rx0, then
U(x1),U(x2) and if x0r x1, x2, then U(x1).U(x2).
15 See, e.g., G. Bingham Powell, Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional
Visions (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000); David Austen-Smith and Jeffery Banks,
‘Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes’, American Political Science Review, 82 (1988), 405–22.
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importance of the formateur, i.e. the party charged with forming the government;16 the
dominance of the party with jurisdiction over the relevant government ministry;17 or a
model in which all parliamentary parties exert some inﬂuence on policy outputs.18
Choosing between these competing models is difﬁcult, because the empirical literature
on the relationship between parties’ policy positions and government policy outputs is
under-developed. McDonald and Budge, however, report empirical results from a study of
twenty-one post-war democracies, which is to our knowledge the only extensive, cross-
national, study that analyses the links between parties’ policy positions and government
policy outputs.19 These authors analyse government policy outputs in three areas – central
government spending, social spending and international policy – and ﬁnd more instances of
statistically signiﬁcant associations with the MPP assumption than with the position of the
government or with that of the relevant government ministries, and that overall support for
an MPP assumption is comparable to that for these alternative assumptions.20
In addition to the McDonald–Budge results summarized above, we note that Cho and
Duggan have recently presented important theoretical results that, as legislators become
arbitrarily patient, a large class of bargaining models of distributive politics collapses to
the position of the median legislator.21 This result, which runs counter to the folk theorem
for repeated games that any possible division of resources can be supported as a subgame
perfect equilibrium outcome, also supports our assumption of the policy primacy of the
MPP. Thus, we have both theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that our model is
relevant to policy making in real world democracies. At the same time, we emphasize
again that our MPP-based model is only one of several plausible models of government
policy outputs, and that the degree to which it captures policy-making processes in real
world democracies surely varies across political contexts. On this basis we proceed.
Assumptions on Voters
We assume that voters’ party evaluations depend on their evaluations of the parties’
policy positions, plus a valence component.22 Speciﬁcally, for each voter i with policy
16 See David Baron, ‘Comparative Dynamics of Parliamentary Governments’, American Political
Science Review, 92 (1998), 593–609; Daniel Diermeier and Timothy Feddersen, ‘Cohesion in Legislatures
and the Vote of Conﬁdence Procedure’, American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), 611–21.
17 See Michael Laver and Kenneth Shepsle, Making and Breaking Governments (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996).
18 See Orit Kedar, ‘When Moderate Voters Prefer Extreme Parties: Policy Balancing in Parliamentary
Elections’, American Political Science Review, 99 (2005), 185–99; Paul Warwick, ‘Coalition Policies in
Parliamentary Democracies: Who Gets How Much and Why,’ Comparative Political Studies, 34 (2001),
1212–36; Samuel Merrill III and James Adams, ‘The Effects of Alternative Power-Sharing Arrangements:
Do ‘‘Moderating’’ Institutions Moderate Party Strategies and Government Policy Outputs?’ Public
Choice, 131 (2007), 413–34.
19 Michael McDonald and Ian Budge, Elections, Parties, and Democracy: Conferring the Median
Mandate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). See also Ian Budge, Michael McDonald, Paul
Pennings and Hans Keman, Organizing Democratic Choice: The Party Mandate over Time (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2012).
20 See McDonald and Budge, Elections, Parties, and Democracy, chap. 8.
21 Seok-ju Cho and John Duggan, ‘Bargaining Foundations of the Median Voter Theorem’, Journal of
Economic Theory, 144 (2009), 851–68.
22 Note that the identity of the MPP is not known to the voters at the time they cast their ballots
because the vote share of each party is yet to be determined. Thus, voters’ evaluations of all parties, not
just the eventual MPP, is relevant to their voting decisions.
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preference xi, the policy distance component of i’s evaluation of party j is given as
ag(sj, xi), where g(sj, xi) represents i’s utility for party j’s position sj, and a is a strictly
positive parameter denoting the salience of the policy dimension relative to the valence
dimension. We assume that for each voter i, g(sj, xi) is concave and peaks at xi. We
assume no abstention.
The valence component of voter i’s evaluation of party j is assumed to be the same
for all voters and has two components: the party’s measured valence characteristics, Vj,
which the parties know at the time they select their policy strategies, and which we label
the party’s long-term valence image; and unmeasured valence characteristics ej, which
capture valence-related events that occur between the dates when the parties select
their policies and election day, and which the parties cannot anticipate at the time they
choose their policy positions. We label the ej terms the parties’ short-term valence images.
Thus:
Voter i0s utility for party j¼ agðsj ; viÞ þ Vj þ j : ð1Þ
Our distinction between the measured, long-term components of valence, Vj, and the
unmeasured, short-term valence components, ej, plausibly captures the information
environment party elites confront as they devise their election strategies. At the time that
parties commit to their policy strategies – which is typically well in advance of the
election23 – political elites are likely to have formed general impressions about the parties’
comparative valence images, based upon their contacts with constituents, public opinion
polls, media coverage and conversations with fellow elites. Such information forms the
basis for the measured, long-term valence component, Vj. However, elites are well aware
that parties’ valence images can ﬂuctuate sharply between the time they select their policy
positions and election day, in response to late-breaking political scandals, voters’
evaluations of politicians’ responses to foreign or domestic crises, changing economic
conditions and how skilfully the parties conduct their election campaigns (we discuss real-
world examples of such short-term valence effects below). The unmeasured, short-term,
valence component ej captures this uncertainty.
Note that our model speciﬁes that voters prefer the party that offers the most attractive
combination of policies and valence characteristics, so that a voter may prefer a party that
is less attractive on policy grounds (relative to its competitors), if this party has strong
valence-related characteristics along such dimensions as competence, integrity and unity.
We assume that all voters vote sincerely. The following remarks, which are proved in
Adams and Merrill,24 develop two important implications of our model, and also support
our assumption of sincere voting:
Remark 1. When all individuals vote sincerely, then the party that is supported by the
median voter will be the MPP.
Remark 2. The situation where all citizens’ votes reﬂect their sincere party preferences
is also an equilibrium in outcome-oriented voters’ strategies, i.e. no voter can increase
her utility for the election outcome by voting strategically.
23 Parties in parliamentary democracies publish detailed policy programmes several weeks (sometimes
months) in advance of the election. These policy programmes, furthermore, usually hew closely to the
policy positions that the party has staked out at its most recent annual party conference, which can take
place up to a year in advance of the election.
24 Adams and Merrill, ‘Policy-Seeking Parties in a Parliamentary Democracy’.
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Assumptions on How Voters Assign Responsibility for Valence-Related Events:
A Generalized Extreme Value (GEV) Model
To this point, our model is identical to the one presented in Adams and Merrill.25 However,
we depart from the Adams–Merrill model in our assumptions about the joint distribution of
the ej’s, where ej is the unknown, short-term component of voters’ valence evaluations of
party j. In the Adams–Merrill model the ej’s are selected independently over parties from a
type 1 extreme value distribution, an assumption that implies that voters’ choice probabilities
can be represented via a logit probability function. Note, however, that independence of the ej
terms is a very strong assumption because, substantively, this implies that there is no
connection between the short-term events that inﬂuence voters’ evaluations of the focal party
j’s valence image, and short-term events or conditions that inﬂuence voters’ evaluations of
other parties’ valence images. Yet this independence speciﬁcation is problematic. Empirically,
there is extensive evidence that in cases of coalition government, voters have difﬁculty
assigning responsibility for economic conditions to any single governing party, so that
governing parties tend to share the credit or blame for the state of the economy.26 In addition,
Michael Clark’s analyses of valence effects in nine West European party systems concludes
that when a governing party’s valence image is damaged due to negative media coverage
pertaining to political scandals, incompetence, or internal divisions, this event has a ‘spillover’
effect that depresses support for the party’s coalition partners.27 Signiﬁcantly, Clark also
identiﬁes this effect with respect to ‘proto-coalitions’ of opposition parties, i.e. groups of
opposition parties that have been in a governing coalition together in the past, and/or that are
viewed as constituting a potential future government.
Two West European elections held in 2002 illustrate the impact of late-breaking,
valence-related, events, and how these effects are mediated by collective responsibility. In
the Dutch parliamentary elections on 15 May 2002, the governing ‘purple coalition’,
consisting of the Labour Party (PvdA), the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy
(VVD), and the Democrats ‘66 (D’66), suffered signiﬁcant electoral losses due to valence-
related events leading up to the election. Pim Fortuyn, the charismatic leader of his own
party, the Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF), was extremely critical of the performance of the
‘purple coalition’, as portrayed by a Fortuyn pamphlet called the Purple Mess. Pim
Fortuyn was assassinated nine days before the election, which served to amplify these
performance-related criticisms in the public, and the difference between the results of
public opinion polls just prior to the parliamentary elections and the actual outcome of
the election suggests that the coalition’s standing was thereby undermined, serving as an
example of a late-breaking valence-related event that plausibly contributed to these
parties’ unexpectedly poor election results.28 Academic accounts suggest that the parties
25 Adams and Merrill, ‘Policy-Seeking Parties in a Parliamentary Democracy’.
26 See, e.g., Michael Lewis-Beck, Economics and Elections (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
1988); G. Bingham Powell and Guy Whitten, ‘A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking
Account of the Political Context’, American Journal of Political Science, 37 (1993), 391–414; Harvey D.
Palmer and Guy D. Whitten, ‘The Electoral Impacts of Unexpected Inﬂation and Economic Growth’,
British Journal of Political Science, 29 (1999), 623–39; Raymond M. Duch and Randy Stevenson, The
Economic Vote: How Political and Economic Institutions Condition Election Results (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2008).
27 See Michael Clark, ‘Valence and Electoral Outcomes: A Cross-National Study of Nine West
European Countries’ (doctoral dissertation, University of California at Santa Barbara, 2006), chap. 4.
28 See, e.g., Kees van Kersbergen, ‘The Christian Democratic Phoenix and Modern Unsecular Politics’,
Party Politics, 14 (2008), 259–79.
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in the purple coalition were held jointly responsible for its performance. Furthermore, in
the September 2002 German Bundestag election the Social Democratic Party and its
leader, Gerhard Schroeder, waged an unexpectedly dynamic campaign that enhanced the
party’s valence image, and helped it achieve an unexpectedly strong election result. There
is, however, little evidence that the SPD’s strong campaign in the 2002 German election
signiﬁcantly enhanced the image of its coalition partner, the Green Party.29
The studies and examples discussed above suggest that political parties’ valence images
are not always independent of each other. In particular, at the time when governing
parties select their policy strategies, they likely anticipate that the government’s handling
of foreign (or domestic) policy crises will have similar effects on the short-term valence
images of all members of the governing coalition, as will economic ﬂuctuations prior to
Election Day.30,31 However the example of the 2002 German election suggests that
collective responsibility is not absolute – i.e. a coalition member’s short-term valence
image can improve (or deteriorate) unexpectedly, for instance due to skilful or inept
campaigning, without affecting its coalition partners’ valence images.
To capture these effects, we employ a generalized extreme value distribution (GEV).
Using the GEV speciﬁcation (the details of which are described in the Appendix), we can
model situations where the error terms associated with parties’ unmeasured, short-term,
valence images are correlated with each other. Speciﬁcally, let the set K of parties be
partitioned into n subsets, or coalitions, labelled c1, c2,y, cn, where C5 {c1, c2,y, cn}.
Within each coalition cf, let rf represent the common correlation between the error terms
ej and ek associated with the unmeasured characteristics of the valence images of any two
parties {j, k}Acf, j 6¼ k. We label rf the collective responsibility coefﬁcient associated with
the coalition of parties, cf, where higher values of rf denote greater degrees of collective
29 See Ludger Helms, ‘The Federal Election in Germany, September 2002’, Electoral Studies, 23 (2004),
143–9.
30 We emphasize that our assumption here is that coalition partners have theoretical reasons before the
fact to project that their short-term valence images – i.e. the components of the voters’ party utilities that
are related to political events that occur between the time these parties select their policy strategies and
election day – will turn out to be correlated after the fact because of short-term ﬂuctuations in economic
conditions, government scandals, etc., which simultaneously depress (enhance) voters’ utilities for all
members of the coalition. This assumption is not directly related to the current lively debate in the
literature on government formation, over whether during the post-election period parties share unobserved
attributes which render problematic the assumption of independent unobserved utilities associated with
alternative governing coalitions (see, e.g., Garrett Glasgow, Matt Golder and Sona N. Golder, ‘Who
Wins? Determining the Party of the Prime Minister’, American Journal of Political Science, 55 (2011),
936–53; Lanny Martin and Randolph T. Stevenson, ‘Incumbency, Context, and Government Formation
in Multiparty Parliamentary Democracies’, American Political Science Review, 104 (2010), 503–18). It
may well be possible to observe the effects of late-breaking economic developments, political scandals,
and international crises after the election is over, in which case these are no longer unobserved components
of voters’ utilities for parties. However, these effects are unknown – hence ‘unobserved’ – by the parties at
the point in the pre-election period when they select their policy strategies, and party elites may plausibly
project that these unobserved components of voters’ utilities for different coalition partners will turn out
to be correlated on Election Day.
31 We note that coalition partners’ long-term valence images also plausibly reﬂect their joint
responsibility for valence-related effects that occur prior to the dates when they select their policy
strategies for the upcoming election. However because we assume that parties’ long-term valence images
are known at the time they choose their policy strategies, parties’ collective responsibility for past events
that contribute to their long-term valence images – which party elites can assess at the time they select
their policy strategies – does not complicate our analyses in the same way as joint responsibility for the
short-term valence-related events that elites cannot anticipate at the time they select their strategies.
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responsibility. Furthermore, let the correlation between all ej and el for which parties j and
l are in different coalitions equal zero. Under these conditions, McFadden demonstrates
that the probability P(k) that the median voter prefers party kAcf is
PðkÞ ¼
exp agðsk ;mÞþVk½ =ð1rf Þ
P
j2cf






exp agðsj ;mÞ þVj½ =ð1rhÞ
" #ð1rhÞ ; ð2Þ
where m denotes the median voter’s position.32 We label the voting model described above




PðjÞf ðsj ;RkÞ: ð3Þ
that is, party k’s expected policy utility is an average of its policy utilities for each party as
a prospective MPP, weighted by the probabilities that each party is in fact the MPP. In
turn, each party k chooses that strategy sk that maximizes its expected policy utility, Uk.
We note that in the special case where rf5 0 for all cfAC, indicating no correlation
between the unmeasured components of parties’ valence images, Equation 2 simpliﬁes to
the familiar logit equation
Pk ¼
exp agðsk;mÞ þVk½ P
j2K
exp agðsj ;mÞþVj½ 
:
We label this special case the basic model.
POLICY-SEEKING EQUILIBRIUM IN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS:
SIMULATION RESULTS
Adams and Merrill report two theoretical results on equilibrium for the basic model
(where rf5 0 for all cfAC):
33 an equilibrium result, that a Nash equilibrium in parties’
policy-seeking strategies must exist;34 and a centripetal valence effects (CVE) result, that a
party has an incentive to unilaterally moderate its policy strategy when the measured
component V of its valence image deteriorates (and to shift to more radical policies when
this image improves).35 The intuition behind the CVE result is that when a party’s valence
32 Daniel McFadden, ‘Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualitative Choice Behavior’, pp. 105–42 in Paul
Zarembka, ed., Frontiers in Econometrics (New York: Academic Press, 1974).
33 Adams and Merrill, ‘Policy-Seeking Parties in a Parliamentary Democracy’.
34 A Nash equilibrium is a conﬁguration of strategies such that no player (here a party) can increase its
expected utility by unilaterally changing its position.
35 The equilibrium result and the CVE result for the basic model are given by Theorems 1–2 in Adams
and Merrill, ‘Policy-Seeking Parties in a Parliamentary Democracy’. A result for two-party elections, that
reaches the same conclusion as the CVE theorem, can be found on pp. 430–1 of Serra, ‘Polarization of
What?’
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image deteriorates, which depresses its probability of being the median parliamentary
party (MPP), it has incentives to moderate its policies – thereby shifting farther away
from its sincere policy preference – in order to recoup some of its diminished electoral
prospects.36 The Adams–Merrill results, however, do not account for the possibility of
collective responsibility.
To investigate the optimal behaviour of all parties under the collective responsibility
model, we use numerical calculations for illustrative cases, because analytic analysis is
intractable. For our illustrative calculations we consider four parties – labelled A, B, C
and D – and we specify the conventional 1–7 scale, that the median voter’s position is
m54, quadratic-loss utility for voters and for parties, and that the policy-salience
parameter is a5 0.25.37 The parties’ preferred policy positions are RA5 1, RB5 3, RC5 5,
RD5 7. We initially assume that the parties A and B form the governing coalition, and
that voters ascribe some degree of collective responsibility to these two parties: formally,
we designate rAB as the correlation between eA and eB, where eA and eB represent the
unmeasured, short-term, components of these parties’ valence images. For the initial
simulations we assume that voters do not ascribe any degree of collective responsibility to
the opposition parties C and D, i.e. the correlation coefﬁcient between the error terms eC
and eD (and between all other pairs of error terms aside from eA and eB) is 0.
Table 1 reports the computed equilibrium strategies38 for alternative values of the
collective responsibility coefﬁcient, ranging from rAB5 0 (i.e. no collective responsibility,
as in the Adams–Merrill basic model) to rAB5 0.9, and for alternative values of
the parties’ measured valence images VA,VB,VC,VD. To clarify the results reported in
Table 1, scenarios 1A–1E (presented in the ﬁrst ﬁve rows) are scenarios where the parties’
long-term valence images are set to the equal values VA5VB5VC5VD5 0
(see column 2). The top row in the table (scenario 1A) reports that when voters ascribe
no collective responsibility to the governing parties A and B (i.e. when rAB5 0),
the equilibrium conﬁguration is fsAn ¼ 2:85; sBn ¼ 3:31; sCn ¼ 4:69; sDn ¼ 5:15g and
36 Note that this CVE result appears contrary to the extremist underdog result that Groseclose presents
in ‘A Model of Candidate Location when One Candidate Has a Valence Advantage’, which states that
valence-disadvantaged candidates have policy-seeking incentives to present more radical positions than
their valence-advantaged competitors. As discussed in Adams and Merrill, ‘Policy-seeking Parties in a
Parliamentary Democracy’, the contrast between the Adams–Merrill CVE result and Groseclose’s
extremist underdog result reﬂects the fact that in Groseclose’s model electoral uncertainty centers on the
median voter’s position, whereas in the Adams–Merrill model uncertainty is over the parties’ short-term
valence images.
37 Note that quadratic loss is a concave function, as speciﬁed in the model. As discussed in Adams and
Merrill, ‘Policy-Seeking Parties in a Parliamentary Democracy’, the policy salience parameter a5 0.25 is
suggested by empirical studies on voting (see, e.g., Tables 4.1, 6.3 and 9.3A in Adams, Merrill and
Grofman, A Uniﬁed Theory of Party Competition). We note that realistic variations in the speciﬁed value
of a did not substantially affect the parties’ equilibrium positions (decreasing a resulted in somewhat more
dispersed equilibrium positions and increasing a somewhat depressed party dispersion). With respect to
variations in the other model parameters used for our examples, we found that: (1) Results for linear loss
utility for parties were similar to those for quadratic losses, but somewhat more dispersed; (2) Results for
larger party systems (i.e. more than four parties) were somewhat more dispersed. Results for alternative
sets of assumptions about the parties’ valence images are reported below.
38 Nash equilibrium strategies are determined by modifying a focal party’s strategy in steps of 0.001 on
the full scale from 1 to 7, while the strategies of the other parties are held ﬁxed, and repeating this process
for each party as the focal party in a cyclic fashion until no further change in strategies are observed. A
systematic investigation strongly supporting the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria is reported in
the section on simulation analysis below.
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Scenario (VA, VB, VC, VD) rAB (sA*, sB*, sC*, sD*) (PA*, PB*, PC*, PD*)
Weighted policy
outcome
(1A) (0, 0, 0, 0) 0 (2.85, 3.31, 4.69, 5.15) (.224, .276, .276, .224) 4.00
(1B) (0, 0, 0, 0) 0.25 (2.92, 3.32, 4.72, 5.20) (.206, .261, .297, .236) 4.10
(1C) (0, 0, 0, 0) 0.50 (2.99, 3.34, 4.74, 5.25) (.185, .248, .319, .248) 4.19
(1D) (0, 0, 0, 0) 0.75 (3.09, 3.35, 4.76, 5.29) (.161, .241, .340, .259) 4.29
(1E) (0, 0, 0, 0) 0.90 (3.20, 3.35, 4.78, 5.34) (.142, .244, .352, .262) 4.35
(2A) (1, 1, 0, 0) 0 (2.58, 3.20, 4.58, 4.94) (.289, .408, .162, .141) 3.49
(2B) (1, 1, 0, 0) 0.25 (2.67, 3.21, 4.61, 4.97) (.271, .397, .177, .154) 3.58
(2C) (1, 1, 0, 0) 0.50 (2.78, 3.22, 4.63, 5.01) (.251, .390, .194, .166) 3.68
(2D) (1, 1, 0, 0) 0.75 (2.93, 3.24, 4.66, 5.06) (.222, .392, .209, .176) 3.79
(2E) (1, 1, 0, 0) 0.90 (3.07, 3.24, 4.68, 5.09) (.197, .403, .218, .182) 3.86
(3A) (0, 0, 1, 1) 0 (3.06, 3.42, 4.80, 5.41) (.141, .162, .408, .289) 4.51
(3B) (0, 0, 1, 1) 0.25 (3.11, 3.43, 4.83, 5.47) (.127, .148, .429, .297) 4.59
(3C) (0, 0, 1, 1) 0.50 (3.16, 3.45, 4.86, 5.52) (.112, .137, .449, .303) 4.68
(3D) (0, 0, 1, 1) 0.75 (3.22, 3.45, 4.85, 5.56) (.094, .127, .471, .307) 4.74
(3E) (0, 0, 1, 1) 0.90 (3.30, 3.44, 4.86, 5.59) (.081, .126, .483, .309) 4.78
(4A) (0, 2, 2, 0) 0 (2.83, 3.28, 4.72, 5.17) (.049, .451, .451, .049) 4.00
(4B) (0, 2, 2, 0) 0.25 (2.89, 3.28, 4.74, 5.19) (.025, .461, .464, .050) 4.04
(4C) (0, 2, 2, 0) 0.50 (2.96, 3.29, 4.74, 5.21) (.006, .472, .470, .051) 4.07
(4D) (0, 2, 2, 0) 0.75 (3.03, 3.29, 4.75, 5.21) (.000, .478, .471, .051) 4.08
(4E) (0, 2, 2, 0) 0.90 (3.16, 3.29, 4.75, 5.21) (.000, .478, .471, .051) 4.08
Notes: Party preferences were set at RA5 1, RB5 3, RC5 5, RD5 7. For these computations parties and voters were assumed to have
quadratic policy losses, the median voter’s position was m5 4, and the policy salience parameter was a5 0.25. The parties’ equilibrium
positions are those that maximize their expected policy utilities, which are given by Equation 3 in the text; their equilibrium probabilities of
being the MPP are calculated using Equation 2 in the text. The weighted policy outcome in the RHS column is the mean of the parties’
































the parties’ equilibrium probabilities of being the MPP are fPAn ¼ 0:224;PBn ¼ 0:276;
PC
n ¼ 0:276;PDn ¼ 0:224g. The next four rows (scenarios 1B–1E) report equilibrium
conﬁgurations for alternative scenarios where voters ascribe varying degrees of collective
responsibility to A and B: rAB ¼ 0:25;rAB ¼ 0:5;rAB ¼ 0:75;rAB ¼ 0:9 (note that higher
values of rAB denote greater degrees of collective responsibility). Table 1 reports results
for ﬁfteen additional scenarios (Scenarios 2A–2E, 3A–3E, and 4A–4E) – to be discussed
below – in which we again vary the parties’ long-term valence images and the degree of
collective responsibility.
The computations reported in Table 1 reveal four striking patterns. First, we located a
unique Nash equilibrium in parties’ policy-seeking strategies for every scenario that we
investigated, which suggests that the Adams–Merrill equilibrium result, which applies to
the special case where there is no collective responsibility, generalizes to the collective
responsibility model that we investigate here. Secondly, note that the parties’ optimal
strategies at equilibrium are highly dispersed. Each party attempts to balance its policy
preference with its likelihood of being the MPP, resulting in two groupings: two parties
(A and B), who present moderate to sharply leftist positions, and two rightist parties
(C and D), who present moderate to sharply rightist positions.39 This pattern was
also identiﬁed in the simulations on the basic model, reported in Adams and Merrill,
‘Policy-seeking Parties in a Parliamentary Democracy.’
The third pattern in Table 1 relates to how collective responsibility inﬂuences parties’
equilibrium positions. Note that as the degree of collective responsibility that voters
ascribe to the governing parties A and B increases, i.e. as the value of rAB increases, the
leftmost governing party (Party A) moderates its position, thereby shifting towards the
position of its centre-left coalition partner, Party B. For instance in the simulations
with VA5VB5VC5VD5 0, party A’s optimal position is sA
n ¼ 2:85, when there is no
collective responsibility (i.e. when rAB5 0 in scenario 1A), but when rAB5 0.5, party
A shifts to a more moderate position, sA
n ¼ 2:99 (scenario 1C), and when rAB5 0.9,
Party A presents an even more moderate position, sA
n ¼ 3:20 (scenario 1E). For this
latter scenario the governing parties’ equilibrium positions are extremely similar
(sA
n ¼ 3:20; sBn ¼ 3:35), so that these parties essentially offer the electorate a single
policy alternative. By contrast, the opposition parties C and D offer more distinctive
policy positions, with D locating approximately 0.5 units to the right of C along the 1–7
scale, and these parties’ positions do not vary greatly as a function of rAB. The same
patterns emerge in the additional sets of simulations reported in scenarios 2A–2E, 3A–3E,
and 4A–4E in Table 1: in each set of scenarios Party A converges towards Party B as these
left-wing governing parties share more collective responsibility, while the opposition
parties C and D – who do not share collective responsibility – maintain distinctive policies
on the right of the policy spectrum.
What accounts for the pattern that we observe in the numerical calculations, in which
collective responsibility motivates the more radical governing party, Party A, to moderate
its position, thereby converging towards its coalition partner, Party B? Party A’s strategic
logic revolves around the fact that when two (or more) coalition partners share collective
responsibility, then these parties’ probabilities of being the MPP are highly sensitive to
each other’s relative policy positions. This is because these coalition partners project that,
39 Note that this grouping into opposing blocs occurs despite the fact that in our illustrative examples,
the parties’ sincere policy preferences are evenly spaced along the Left–Right dimension.
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to the extent that their short-term valence images ﬂuctuate, these images will likely ﬂuctuate
in tandem because voters will ascribe joint responsibility to these parties for valence-related
events or conditions. Therefore, in the presence of collective responsibility, it is critical to a
focal party’s goal of becoming the MPP – which is necessary in order for this party
to implement its announced policies – that the focal party be in a strong electoral position
vis-a`-vis its coalition partner(s) at the time that it announces its policy strategy. And, given
that in the scenarios we investigate the more radical governing party A is at an electoral
disadvantage vis-a`-vis its coalition partner, Party B (in terms of these parties’ relative
likelihoods of winning the support of the median voter and thus becoming the MPP), this
strategic imperative motivates Party A to moderate its position, thereby improving its
electoral standing vis-a`-vis Party B.40 We label the strategic imperative for coalition partners
to improve their electoral standing relative to each other the coalition convergence effect. In
supplementary materials we support the interpretation offered above with the theoretical
result shown in the following sub-section.41
The Peripheral Governing Party Moderation Theorem
Suppose that party K is a member of a coalition cf, that K’s optimal position lies strictly
between its sincere policy preference RK and the median voter position m, that this
equilibrium position is to the left (right) of all competing parties, and that K’s equilibrium
probability P(K) of being the MPP is smaller than the MPP probabilities of the other
members of the coalition cf. Then if the collective responsibility coefﬁcient rf increases, K
is motivated to unilaterally moderate its position relative to the median voter position m,
i.e. to converge towards the positions of its coalition partners.
In words, the theorem states that when a member of a governing coalition is a
peripheral party, i.e. when it promises the most radical right-wing or left-wing policies of
all the parties contesting the election, and when moreover this peripheral party’s prospects
of becoming the MPP are weaker than those of its coalition partner(s), then, as the degree
of collective responsibility shared by the coalition members increases, this party
experiences strategic pressure to moderate its policies. This result is relevant to the
computations reported in Table 1, where the left-most party A has a lower equilibrium
probability of being the MPP than does its coalition partner, Party B, and where Party
A’s equilibrium position becomes increasingly moderate as the collective responsibility
coefﬁcient rAB increases.
We note that the peripheral governing party moderation result is relevant to many real
world scenarios where small, non-centrist, parties – such as the German Greens and the
French Communists – have entered into governing coalitions with large, mainstream,
coalition partners (such as the German Social Democrats and the French Socialists). In
40 Readers may wonder why the strategic imperatives relating to collective responsibility delineated in
this paragraph do not motivate Party B to signiﬁcant moderate its policies, in order to improve its
electoral standing vis-a`-vis its coalition partner, Party A. The answer is that, ﬁrst, Party A’s optimal
strategy sA* is similar to Party B’s preferred position RB5 3, so that B has little incentive to moderate its
strategy sB* in order to improve its electoral standing vis-a`-vis Party A (by contrast, B’s optimal strategy is
spatially distant from A’s preferred position RA5 1, so that A has stronger incentives to improve its
electoral standing vis-a`-vis Party B). Secondly, in the examples we investigate here the governing Party B is
already in a strong electoral position vis-a`-vis Party A due to its greater proximity to the median voter
position, and so experiences less strategic pressure to further moderate its position.
41 See supplementary materials available at: http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid5JPS.
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these scenarios the peripheral governing party moderation theorem implies that the
smaller, more radical, coalition member will experience pressure to moderate its policies
by converging towards the position of its more centrist coalition partner.
The fourth pattern in Table 1 relates to how collective responsibility affects parties’
probabilities of being the median parliamentary party (MPP). Note that as voters ascribe
more collective responsibility to the governing parties A and B, these parties’ equilibrium
probabilities of being the MPP decline (see the second column from the right in Table 1).
For instance, for the ﬁrst scenario in Table 1, we see that when voters ascribe no collective
responsibility to A and B, i.e. when rAB5 0, then these parties’ equilibrium probabilities
of being MPP are PA
n ¼ 0:224; PBn ¼ 0:276 (scenario 1A). However for rAB5 0.5 these
probabilities decline to PA
n ¼ 0:185; PBn ¼ 0:248 (scenario 1C), and for rAB5 0.9 these
equilibrium probabilities decline even more, to PA
n ¼ 0:142; PBn ¼ 0:244 (scenario
1E).42 The additional scenarios 2A–2E, 3A–3E, and 4A–4E display similar patterns. And,
these reductions in the leftist governing parties’ prospects of being MPP, as a function of
collective responsibility, imply an increased probability that one of the right-wing
opposition parties (C or D) becomes the MPP. The effects of these probability changes
are displayed in the RHS column of Table 1, which reports the weighted policy outcome
of the election, deﬁned as the mean of the parties’ equilibrium positions weighted by their
equilibrium probabilities of being the MPP. We see that as voters ascribe more collective
responsibility to the leftist governing parties A and B (i.e. as rAB increases), this weighted
policy mean shifts to the right, away from the governing parties’ preferred positions.
These results thereby suggest that collective responsibility depresses the responsible
parties’ prospects of being the MPP, which in turn damages their policy expectations. We
label this the coalition penalty effect.
Why does collective responsibility depress coalition partners’ probabilities of becoming the
MPP? The intuition is that when voters ascribe high degrees of collective responsibility to a
coalition of parties, then, substantively, the voters view these parties as being interchangeable,
in the sense that the coalition members no longer represent distinct alternatives to the
voters.43 Thus from the voters’ perspectives, high degrees of collective responsibility
effectively collapse the distinct alternatives that coalition members would otherwise represent
into a single alternative – an effect that depresses the likelihood that the median voter will
prefer some member of the coalition to all the parties outside the coalition.
Additional Illustrative Examples
Scenarios 2A–2E, 3A–3E, and 4A–4E in Table 1 illustrate alternative scenarios in which
we vary the parties’ long-term valence images, along with the degree of collective
responsibility. In scenarios 2A–2E, for instance, the governing parties A and B are
42 Note that the reduction in the governing parties’ prospects of being MPP, as collective responsibility
increases, occurs despite the fact that Party A signiﬁcantly moderates its equilibrium policies when
collective responsibility is high. If A did not moderate its position in response to increases in rAB, its
likelihood of being MPP would decline even more sharply.
43 This effect is analogous to that outlined in the famous ‘red bus/blue bus’ example, that is often used to
illustrate how unobserved similarities between different alternatives inﬂuence individuals’ choice probabilities
(see, e.g., Kenneth Train, Qualitative Choice Analysis, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1986): If a commuter
faces a choice between riding her car to work or taking a red bus, then if a new alternative – a blue bus – is
added to the choice set, this can be expected to have little to no effect on the commuter’s probability of
choosing her car, because she will view the red and blue buses as interchangeable options. However adding
the blue bus to the choice set depresses the probability that the commuter chooses the red bus.
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speciﬁed as having stronger long-term valence images than the opposition parties C and
D, i.e. VA5VB5 1, VC5VD5 0.
44 Consistent with the centripetal valence effects (CVE)
result that Adams and Merrill prove for the basic model,45 we see that the governing
parties’ improved long-term valence images motivate them to shift to more radical
positions, compared to their positions for scenario 1, in which all parties have equal
long-term valence images. The results for scenarios 3A–3E, in which the governing parties
A and B are speciﬁed as having weaker valence images than the opposition parties
(i.e. VA5VB5 0, VC5VD5 1), again support the CVE result: now the governing parties
A and B moderate their positions in order to recoup their electoral prospects. Finally,
scenarios 4A–4E illustrate the situation where the centre parties, B and C, have stronger
long-term valence images than the peripheral parties A and D, i.e. VA5VD5 0,
VB5VC5 2.
46 This corresponds to the common real world scenario where a large,
mainstream, party such as the Dutch Labour Party, the French Socialists or the German
Social Democrats, governs in coalition with a smaller and more radical party (or parties).
Compared to scenario 1, in which all parties have equal long-term valence, we see that in
scenario 4 the centrist parties shift to (slightly) more radical policies, which again supports
the CVE result. And, note that for all of the scenarios in Table 1, increases in the
collective responsibility term rAB are associated with more moderate equilibrium positions
for the peripheral coalition member Party A, a pattern that supports the peripheral
governing party moderation theorem. By contrast the equilibrium position of the
moderate coalition member, Party B, is not very responsive to the value of rAB.
Extensions to Alternative Scenarios: Opposition ‘Proto-Coalitions’ and Centrist
Governing Coalitions
Table 2 reports computations for scenarios that illustrate additional strategic implications
of the collective responsibility model. Table 2A presents computations for situations
where voters assign collective responsibility to the governing parties A and B and to the
‘proto-coalition’ of opposition parties C and D. For both sets of scenarios illustrated in
Table 2A – one where all parties have equal long-term valence images (scenarios 5A–5C)
and one where the centrist parties B and C have stronger long-term valence images
(scenarios 6A–6C) – we see that the coalition convergence effect operates for both the
governing coalition and the opposition proto-coalition: namely, as collective
responsibility increases, the peripheral parties A and D converge towards the positions
of their coalition partners, as the peripheral governing party moderation theorem
predicts. Indeed, when the collective responsibility coefﬁcient is set to the high value
rAB5 0.9, there is minimal policy differentiation within each coalition (i.e. the coalition
partners are separated by less than 0.2 units along the 1–7 Left–Right scale) but
substantial policy variation between the coalitions, i.e. the policy distance between the
coalitions is nearly 1.5 units on the 1–7 scale. These computations thereby illustrate
how the strategic incentives associated with collective responsibility can transform a
44 Substantively, the values VA5VB5 1, VC5VD5 0 imply that when all the parties are equidistant
from the median voter’s position (and rAB5 0), then the probability that one of the governing parties
(A or B) will be MPP is about 0.73.
45 Adams and Merrill, ‘Policy-Seeking Parties in a Parliamentary Democracy’.
46 The values VA5VD5 0, VB5VC5 2 imply that when all the parties are equidistant from the
median voter’s position (and rAB5 0), then the probability that either B or C will be MPP is about 0.88.
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multi-party system into what is effectively a two-party system, in terms of the meaningful
policy alternatives offered to the electorate.
Table 2B reports computations for scenarios where the governing coalition now
comprises the two centrist parties B and C. Again, we see that as the degree of collective
responsibility increases, the coalition partners converge towards each other (the coalition
convergence effect), and that collective responsibility again depresses the coalition
partners’ probabilities of being the MPP (the coalition penalty effect).
In toto, the computations reported in Tables 1–2 suggest that the two central results
that Adams and Merrill identiﬁed for a basic policy-seeking model – i.e. a model that does
not incorporate collective responsibility – extend to the collective responsibility
model:47namely, an equilibrium result, that an equilibrium conﬁguration in parties’
policy-seeking strategies will exist, and a centripetal valence effects (CVE) result, that
parties will moderate (radicalize) their policy strategies when their long-term valence
images deteriorate (improve). Our computations and theoretical results also identify three
additional effects relating to collective responsibility: a coalition convergence effect, that as
coalition partners share more collective responsibility they converge towards each other’s
policy positions; a peripheral governing party moderation effect, that coalition convergence
is often driven by smaller, more radical coalition partners moderating their policies as
collective responsibility increases; and a coalition penalty effect, that collective
responsibility depresses coalition partners’ probabilities of being the MPP, which in
turn diminishes their policy expectations. All the conclusions of this paragraph are further
substantiated by our computer simulation analysis in the next section.
Simulation Analysis
To substantiate the conclusions suggested by our illustrative examples and the peripheral
governing party moderation theorem, we simulated 1,000 four-party elections in which
parameters were chosen randomly from a parameter space, with the parties’ probabilities of
being the MPP given by Equation 2 above. Parties A and B were assumed to be the
governing parties, and the value of the collective responsibility coefﬁcient rAB was chosen
from a uniform distribution on the interval [0.0, 0.9], while voters were assumed to ascribe
no collective responsibility to the opposition parties C and D (i.e. rCD5 0). Parties’ long-
term valence images were chosen independently from a uniform distribution on the interval
from 0.0 to 2.0, and the preferred policy positions for parties A, B, C and D were chosen
from uniform distributions on the intervals [1.0, 2.5], [2.5, 4.0], [4.0, 5.5] and [5.5, 7.0],
respectively. The median voter position was set at m5 4, the policy salience coefﬁcient was
set to a5 0.25, and quadratic policy losses were used for voters and parties.
For these simulations we located an equilibrium conﬁguration for all but three of the
1,000 scenarios we generated,48 which again supports the hypothesis that the Adams–Merrill
equilibrium existence result – which applies to the basic model – extends generally to the
collective responsibility model that we analyse here. To assess uniqueness of the equilibrium
in each scenario, we generated for each of the 1,000 scenarios two sets of starting values, with
47 Adams and Merrill, ‘Policy-Seeking Parties in a Parliamentary Democracy’.
48 All three aberrant scenarios occurred when the collective responsibility coefﬁcient rAB was high
(above 0.8) and the valence of one coalition partner was very low relative to that of the other coalition
partner, resulting in an extremely ﬂat utility function for the low valence party and an unstable calculated
optimal strategy for that party.
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TABLE 2 Equilibrium Positions for Alternative Scenarios
Valence Images Responsibility Coefﬁcients Equilibrium Positions
Equilibrium MPP
Probabilities
Scenario (VA, VB, VC, VD) rAB rCD (sA*, sB*, sC*, sD*) (PA*, PB*, PC*, PD*)
2A. Voters assign collective responsibility to both coalitions (A-B and C-D)
(5A) (0, 0, 0, 0) 0 0 (2.85, 3.31, 4.69, 5.15) (.224, .276, .276, .224)
(5C) (0, 0, 0, 0) 0.50 0.50 (2.91, 3.29, 4.71, 5.09) (.207, .293, .293, .207)
(5E) (0, 0, 0, 0) 0.90 0.90 (3.10, 3.26, 4.74, 4.90) (.171, .329, .329, .171)
(6A) (0, 2, 2, 0) 0 0 (2.83, 3.28, 4.72, 5.17) (.049, .451, .451, .049)
(6C) (0, 2, 2, 0) 0.50 0.50 (2.93, 3.27, 4.73, 5.07) (.007, .493, .493, .007)
(6E) (0, 2, 2, 0) 0.90 0.90 (3.16, 3.27, 4.73, 4.84) (.000, .500, .500, .000)
2B. Voters assign collective responsibility to the Centre Parties B-C
(7A) (0, 0, 0, 0) 0 (2.85, 3.31, 4.69, 5.15) (.224, .276, .276, .224)
(7C) (0, 0, 0, 0) 0.50 (2.85, 3.42, 4.58, 5.15) (.263, .237, .237, .263)
(7E) (0, 0, 0, 0) 0.90 (2.85, 3.66, 4.34, 5.15) (.290, .210, .210, .290)
(8A) (0, 2, 2, 0) 0 (2.83, 3.28, 4.72, 5.17) (.049, .451, .451, .049)
(8C) (0, 2, 2, 0) 0.50 (2.82, 3.39, 4.61, 5.18) (.065, .435, .435, .065)
(8E) (0, 2, 2, 0) 0.90 (2.81, 3.65, 4.35, 5.19) (.077, .423, .423, .077)
Notes: Party preferences were set at RA5 1, RB5 3, RC5 5, RD5 7. For these computations parties and voters were assumed to have
quadratic policy losses, the median voter’s position was m54, and the policy salience parameter was a5 0.25. The parties’ equilibrium
positions are those that maximize their expected policy utilities, which are given by equation 3 in the text; their equilibrium probabilities of
































each starting value for each party randomly generated on the continuous interval from 1 to
7. In all but ﬁve of the 1,000 scenarios the two sets of starting values led to the same set of
equilibrium conﬁgurations, strongly supporting the conclusion that the equilibria are in
nearly all cases unique.49 Finally, the evidence is strong that the equilibria are generally
global (not just local) because each party’s equilibrium position was evaluated as optimal
by calculating its utility while varying its location in steps of 0.001 over the entire scale from
1 to 7. Thus, overall, we have strong evidence that, for the collective responsibility model,
unique Nash (global) equilibrium conﬁgurations virtually always exist for an extensive
parameter space.
The parties’ preferred positions and their optimal strategies were then normalized by
taking the absolute distance from the median voter’s position. Each party j’s optimal
strategies were regressed on seven independent variables: the party’s preferred position Rj;
the square of this position R2j , the party’s long-term valence image Vj; the degree of
collective responsibility that voters assign to the governing parties, rAB; and the
interaction terms (Rj3Vj), (Rj3 rAB), and (Vj3 rAB), resulting in equations for the
optimal strategy of party j of the form:
sj ¼ b0 þ b1Rj þ b2R2j þ b3Vj þ b4rAB þ b5ðRj  VjÞ þ b6ðRj  rABÞ
þ b7ðVj  rABÞ:
Regression statistics are presented in Table 3 for each of the four parties. As expected –
and as indicated by the positive coefﬁcients on the preferred positions (Rj) – all four
parties move to signiﬁcantly more extreme positions as their preferred positions become
more extreme, but at a diminishing rate (as indicated by the negative coefﬁcients on R2j ).
The moderating effect of greater collective responsibility on the optimal strategy of party
A is greater as party A’s preferred position becomes more extreme, as indicated by the
highly signiﬁcant negative sign of the coefﬁcient of the interaction term (Rj3 rAB). In
addition, the fact that this coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant (and negative) for Party A but not for
B implies that the policy distance between these parties’ equilibrium positions diminishes
as collective responsibility increases – an observation that supports the coalition
convergence effect we identiﬁed earlier. Furthermore, the highly signiﬁcant positive
coefﬁcient of (Vj3 rAB) shows that the optimal position of peripheral governing party
A becomes more moderate as its valence decreases along with enhanced collective
responsibility with its coalition partner B. This effect supports the peripheral governing
party moderation effect, that smaller, more radical coalition partners moderate their
policies as collective responsibility increases. Finally, we note that the optimal positions of
the two parties not in the government coalition (C and D) are not signiﬁcantly affected by
the variables involving the collective responsibility coefﬁcient rAB of the governing parties,
except for the dependence of party C on (Rj3 rAB)ðRj  rABÞ.
The parties’ mean equilibrium probabilities of being the MPP over the simulation runs
(see the bottom row of Table 3) indicate that the coalition partners A and B have
diminished prospects of becoming the MPP, compared to their counterparts from outside
the coalition: speciﬁcally, the left-most coalition member, Party A, has a lower mean MPP
49 In all ﬁve of the scenarios in which different starting values led to distinct computed strategies for a
party, the parties’ computed equilibrium positions for different starting points differed by less than 0.07
units along the 1–7 scale. In each of these ﬁve cases the value of rAB was high and the valences of the
coalition partners A and B were highly disparate.
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TABLE 3 Regression Results for Simulated Data
Party A Party B Party C Party D
Intercept 0.49** (0.12) 20.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.41** (0.13)




20.03 (0.02) 20.19** (0.01) 20.17** (0.01) 20.06* (0.02)
Valence (Vj) 20.02 (0.04) 0.02 (0.01) 20.01 (0.01) 20.01 (0.04)
Collective responsibility
coefﬁcient (rAB)
20.01 (0.08) 20.01 (0.02) 20.02 (0.02) 0.15 (0.09)
(Rj3Vj) 0.04* (0.02) 0.04** (0.01) 0.07** (0.01) 0.05** (0.02)
(Rj3 rAB) 20.18** (0.03) 0.00 (0.02) 0.09** (0.02) 20.02 (0.04)
(Vj3 rAB) 0.14** (0.02) 20.02 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.02 (0.03)
R2 0.53 0.95 0.96 0.41
Mean preferred position 1.77 3.25 4.75 6.26
Mean optimal position 3.04 3.48 4.56 5.13
Standard deviation of
preferred position
0.43 0.44 0.43 0.42
Standard deviation of
optimal position
0.18 0.28 0.30 0.16
Mean probability of being
the MPP
0.201 0.250 0.299 0.250
Notes: In these analyses the dependent variable was the absolute distance between the focal party’s equilibrium position and the median voter
position. Regression results are based on the 993 (out of 1,000) simulated four-party elections that yielded unique convergent equilibrium
conﬁgurations (see the text of the article for a description of these simulations). Regression coefﬁcients signiﬁcantly different from zero at the
0.05 level are indicated by (*); those signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level, by (**). Values in parentheses are standard errors. (Regression coefﬁcients
using all 1000 simulated scenarios and one of the equilibrium sets for each of the seven aberrant cases differ only minutely from those reported
above.) Parties A and B were assumed to be the governing parties. The collective responsibility coefﬁcient rAB was chosen from a uniform
distribution on the interval [0.0, 0.9], parties’ long-term valence images VA,VB,VC,VD were chosen independently from a uniform distribution
on the interval from 0.0 to 2.0, while their preferred policy positions RA, RB, RC, RD were chosen from uniform distributions on the intervals
































probability than the right-most party from outside the coalition, party D, while the
moderate coalition party, Party B, has a lower mean MPP probability than the moderate
party outside the coalition, Party C. As a result the mean weighted policy outcome over
the simulations was 4.13, signiﬁcantly to the right of the median voter position, m5 4.
This supports the proposition that collective responsibility diminishes the coalition
parties’ policy expectations – the coalition penalty effect that we identiﬁed earlier.
Finally, we see that parties’ optimal strategies are more moderate than their preferred
positions (see the comparison between the parties’ mean preferred positions and their mean
optimal strategies, presented near the bottom of Table 3), most strikingly for the two extreme
parties A and D, and especially for party A which is subject to the peripheral governing party
moderation effect. This effect results in an equilibrium conﬁguration in which the two parties
on the left (and the two parties on the right) are much closer to each other than they are to the
locations of the other coalition members. In fact, the gap between the mean optimal strategy
for parties B and C is about twice the size of the gap between parties A and B or between
parties C and D. Hence, the parties naturally coalesce into centre-left and centre-right
coalitions, even though their preferred positions were drawn from equally-spaced intervals.
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Our computational and theoretical results suggest that introducing collective responsibility
into a model of policy-seeking parties in a PR-based parliamentary democracy, generates
interesting new insights into the nature of parties’ policy strategies. On the one hand,
our computations suggest that the two central theoretical results that Adams and Merrill
derive for a basic model50 – one that omits collective responsibility – extend to the collective
responsibility model we present here: namely, we ﬁnd numerically for a wide range of
parameter values that a global (Nash) equilibrium in parties’ policy-seeking strategies almost
invariably exists and is unique, and, furthermore, that parties have incentives to moderate
(radicalize) their policies when their long-term valence images improve (decline) – the
centripetal valence effect result. On the other hand, we have identiﬁed three additional
strategic incentives associated with collective responsibility: a coalition convergence effect,
that jointly responsible parties have policy-seeking incentives to converge towards similar
policy positions; a peripheral governing party moderation effect, that coalition convergence is
primarily driven by smaller, more radical coalition members moderating their policies and
thereby converging towards the positions of their larger, more mainstream, coalition
partners; and a coalition penalty effect, that sharing joint responsibility for short-term,
valence-related, events depresses coalition partners’ policy expectations. This latter effect
provides strategic incentives for political parties that approve of the government’s policies to
support the government from outside the coalition – as opposed to formally joining the
coalition – in order to side-step collective responsibility for valence-related events that reﬂect
on all the governing parties. Such incentives may contribute to the widely discussed
phenomenon ofminority governments, i.e. governing coalitions that control less than half the
seats in parliament.51 Contemporary examples of this minority government phenomenon
include Norwegian politics, where the small, left-wing, Socialist Party typically supports the
large, centre-left, Labour Party from outside the government, and the current minority
ruling coalition of the Dutch People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) and the
50 Adams and Merrill, ‘Policy-Seeking Parties in a Parliamentary Democracy’.
51 See, e.g., Strøm, Minority Government and Majority Rule.
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Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), which is supported from outside the formal coalition
by the Party for Freedom (PVV).52
From an empirical standpoint, it would seem promising to evaluate empirically the strategic
policy positioning incentives we have identiﬁed relating to the coalition convergence effect and
the peripheral governing party moderation effect. As we noted in the introduction,
remarkable empirical research by Fortunato and Stevenson concludes that rank-and-ﬁle
voters typically perceive the policy positions of partners in governing coalitions as converging
over time, a pattern that supports our coalition convergence effect argument;53 these authors,
however, propose an alternative explanation for this empirical pattern that emphasizes the
information shortcuts citizens employ to infer party policy positions.54 It would be useful to
conduct follow-up empirical research to parse out these alternative explanations. In addition,
we are conducting an empirical study to evaluate our hypothesized peripheral governing party
moderation effect, that small, peripheral members of coalitions show disproportionate
tendencies to moderate their policies.
The hypothesized coalition penalty effect we identify raises an additional empirical
question: if real world parties are policy-seeking, as we assume in our model, but parties suffer
penalties in terms of their expected policy payoffs when they join a governing coalition,
then why do parties ever choose to enter into coalitions as opposed to supporting a minority
one-party government from outside the government?55 With respect to this question, we
suggest two promising lines for future investigation. The ﬁrst is that real world party elites are
largely unaware of the coalition penalty effect we identify, at least as it relates to the strategic
disadvantages associated with collective responsibility.56 Given that we have just developed
the coalition penalty effect hypothesis – which we hope political scientists and politicians will
view as a novel argument! – it seems plausible that party elites sometimes fail to project how
the collective responsibility that comes with coalition membership can hamper their long-term
policy objectives. A second possibility – one that applies particularly to smaller parties that
have limited histories of participating in government – is that these parties’ elites project that
coalition membership will burnish the party’s image with respect to voters’ perceptions of the
52 With respect to this point, we note that our peripheral governing party moderation result – that as
collective responsibility increases small, non-centrist, governing parties experience pressure to moderate
their policy images – may pose a difﬁcult strategic dilemma for niche parties, i.e. green, communist, and
radical right parties. Research by Adams et al. and by Spoon suggests that niche parties risk severe
electoral losses when they moderate their policy positions, because such policy moderation alienates their
core supporters, who believe that such policy convergence compromises the party’s core values (see James
Adams, Michael Clark, Lawrence Ezrow and Garrett Glasgow, ‘Are Niche Parties Fundamentally
Different from Mainstream Parties? The Causes and the Electoral Consequences of Western European
Parties’ Policy Shifts, 1976–1998,’ American Journal of Political Science, 50 (2006), 513–29; and Jae-Jae
Spoon, Political Survival of Small Parties in Europe (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2011)).
This suggests that niche parties – such as the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV) referenced above – have
strong incentives to support the government from outside the formal governing coalition. We thank an
anonymous reviewer for emphasizing this point.
53 Fortunato and Stevenson, ‘Perceptions of Partisan Ideologies’.
54 We thank an anonymous reviewer for drawing our attention to this point.
55 We thank Hugh Ward for drawing our attention to this issue.
56 We note that party elites are surely aware of the so-called ‘penalty of governance’, whereby
governing parties’ vote shares typically decline over time (see, e.g., Martin Paldam, ‘How Robust is the
Vote Function? A Study of Seventeen Nations over Two Decades’, in Helmut Norpoth, Michael Lewis-
Beck and Jean-Dominique Lafay, eds, Economics and Politics: The Calculus of Support (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1991), pp. 9–32). To our knowledge, however, this penalty is rarely
associated with the collective responsibility phenomenon that we emphasize in this article.
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party’s competence and leadership ability, i.e. its ability to govern. In this regard, some
commentators argue that the British Liberal Democrats’ decision to enter into a governing
coalition with the Conservative party, following the May 2010 general election, was driven by
the Liberal Democratic leader Nick Clegg’s belief that formal participation in government –
the party’s ﬁrst such participation during the post-war period – would convince the British
public that the Liberal Democrats could be trusted to govern the country, a perception that
might strengthen the party’s appeal in subsequent elections.57 This suggests that we might
extend our model to incorporate projected changes in parties’ valence images relating to
formal government participation. These considerations notwithstanding, we believe the
coalition penalty effect we identify offers a promising explanation for the phenomenon of
minority government, which has long puzzled political scientists.
From a theoretical standpoint, our conclusions on how collective responsibility affects
parties’ policy-seeking strategies is relevant to work by Adams, on how collective
responsibility affects parties’ vote-seeking strategies – which is to our knowledge the only
previous study that incorporates collective responsibility into the spatial modelling
framework.58 In contrast to our conclusion that policy-seeking parties tend to converge
towards each other’s positions when they share collective responsibility, Adams concludes
that vote-seeking parties that share collective responsibility have incentives to diverge in
the policy space.59 This suggests that the phenomenon of collective responsibility is
important for party strategies regardless of parties’ mixtures of vote-seeking versus ofﬁce-
seeking motivations – but that the implications of collective responsibility differ
depending on which goal is most salient to party elites.
AP PEND IX
The Generalized Extreme Value (GEV) model is speciﬁed as follows. Let the set K of parties be
partitioned into n subsets labelled c1, c2,y, cn, where C5 {c1, c2,y, cn}. The utility that the voter
i obtains from party j in subset cf is denoted UiðjÞ ¼ agðsj ; viÞ þ Vj þ j , where ½agðsj ; viÞ þ Vj  is
measured and ej is the unmeasured, random variable. The GEV model is obtained by assuming that
the ej, for all jAcf are distributed according to the GEV distribution. For the GEV, the joint












57 See, e.g., Philip Norton, ‘The Politics of Coalition’, in Nicholas Allen and John Bartle, eds, Britain at
the Polls 2010 (London: Sage, 2011).
58 James Adams, ‘Policy Divergence in Multicandidate Probabilistic Spatial Voting’, Public Choice, 99
(1999), 259–74.
59 The central intuition underlying Adams’s result is that when two governing parties, say parties A and
B for instance, share collective responsibility for valence-related events, then, if they converge to similar
policy positions, they will tend to split the votes of the same group of supporters – i.e. most voters who
prefer Party A to the rival parties C and D will also prefer Party B to parties C and D. Thus, in this
example the collectively responsible parties A and B have electoral incentives to diverge in the policy
space, so as to draw support from different voting constituencies. However, when A and B are policy-
seeking this strategic incentive no longer applies, because policy-seeking parties cannot rationally
announce policies that diverge too sharply from their sincere policy beliefs, at least in situations where
they are obligated to fulﬁl their pre-election promises in the event they gain power, as we assume in our
model.
60 Train, Qualitative Choice Analysis.
22 ADAMS, EZROW, MERRILL AND SOMER-TOPCU
This distribution is a generalization of the distribution that gives rise to the logit model. For logit,
each ej is independent with a univariate extreme value distribution. For GEV, the marginal
distributions of each ej within each subset are correlated with each other. Speciﬁcally, rf is the
correlation of the error terms within each subset, cf. For any two candidates j and k that are in
different subsets, there is no correlation between ej and ek.
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